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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXI NUMBER 4

The Indo-Chinese Puzzle

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French high commissioner and commander-in-chief of the French forces fighting in Indo-China, had reason to be satisfied with his September mission to the United States. On the eve of his visit the three "associated states" of Indo-China—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—participated as independent nations in the signing of the Japanese peace treaty at San Francisco on September 8. De Lattre's insistence that in Indo-China France was fighting America's battle against communism as well as its own received a sympathetic hearing in Washington. He left with assurances of increased military aid for the French expeditionary corps.

In Indo-China American efforts to contain communism have associated this country, in Asian eyes, with a colonial war. The French knew that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist when they tried to reach an agreement with him in 1946. At that time negotiations broke down over his nationalist demands, not over his Communist affiliation. American representatives, latecomers to the scene, have consistently tried to distinguish between Vietnamese nationalism, which we would like to see aligned behind Emperor Bao Dai (whose

government was recognized by Washington in February 1950), and Vietnamese communism, symbolized by Ho. This, however, is not yet an entirely valid distinction. The United States is on record as favoring nationalism in Indo-China; and we have urged the French to make concessions to nationalist sentiment. But there still appear to be many more nationalists who oppose Bao Dai than there are who support him.

Available evidence indicates that the Communists have consolidated their control over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Indo-Chinese Communist party, formally dissolved in the fall of 1945, was reborn early this year as the new Laodong (Labor) party. Truong Chinh, long-term Communist and general secretary of the party, said: "The Vietnam Labor party is the vanguard and general staff of the working class and working people of Vietnam. . . . When economic conditions in Vietnam are ripe and when the great majority of our people approve and long for socialism, we will realize a socialist regime." The party is based on "the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and on the ideology of Mao Tse-tung." It urges leader-

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ship of the revolution by the working class.

Led by the Labor party, the Ho forces are closing their ranks in preparation for a long and hard war. March 1951 marked a new attempt at a united front. The Communist-led Viet Minh, itself a coalition movement, merged with the Lien Viet (National United Front) and a new, more inclusive Lien Viet was proclaimed. It has tried to rally all elements of the population behind it, not just workers and peasants but also the *bourgeoisie* and the landowners. Spokesmen of the Vietnam Democratic party and the Vietnam Socialist party, which had worked closely with the Viet Minh, have announced their membership in the Lien Viet Front and their support of the Laodong party, as have labor, peasant and religious groups in the Ho areas.

Ho's Area of Control

Lien Viet leaders recognize that in a country which is almost entirely agricultural the future of their movement depends on the peasantry. It was apparently in response to widespread dissatisfaction among the peasants that Ho recently abolished the multiplicity of taxes imposed upon them in favor of a single tax in kind to be estimated in terms of the average annual harvest. "Increase production," is said to be the watchword throughout the Ho areas.

Lien Viet elements have infiltrated into Laos and Cambodia where they have joined forces with local resistance groups. The constitutional monarchs of both countries in alliance

with the French, have been unable to stamp out the "Free" Cambodian and Laotian movements. Representatives of the Khmer United Front (Cambodia), the Laotian People's United Front and the Lien-Viet met last March to set up a Joint National United Front. One of their resolutions stated: "The basic task of the Vietnam, Cambodian and Laotian revolutions is to drive out the French aggressors and the American interventionists, so as to achieve the genu-

What Do You Think?

We have received many letters commenting favorably on the new FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Readers are particularly enthusiastic about the *Foreign Policy Forum*. Send us your ideas as to controversial issues of foreign policy you would like to see discussed in the *Forum*, and let us know what you think about the new BULLETIN.

ine independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos."

The Ho forces control substantial areas in north, central and south Vietnam; and they have many friends in areas controlled by the French and nominally ruled by Bao Dai. They have not scrupled to use terror against their opponents. But this is certainly not the only reason why so many Vietnamese who have remained aloof from Ho have also refused to have anything to do with Bao Dai. By and large they do not

fear communism as much as they want independence; and this Bao Dai has not yet fully achieved.

French Concessions

France has yielded considerable authority to the Bao Dai regime and is building up a Vietnamese army. But much of the effective authority in Vietnam still remains in French hands. Nguyen Phan Long, Bao Dai's first prime minister, was dropped in May 1950 because he attempted too independent a policy and was replaced by Tran Van Huu, who was more amenable to the French and less friendly to the resistance. Huu tried to broaden his cabinet this year but was unable to persuade a single political party to work with him.

The Bao Dai government was once envisaged by the French as an important political weapon to win the Vietnamese away from Ho. It has not yet accomplished this end. For the French the problem has become essentially a military one. French losses up to now total some 38,000. The French have spent more than \$2 billion on the Vietnamese war. They have had to turn to the United States for military and economic help. Now that the fighting has flared up again in Indo-China, the question is to what extent the Chinese Communists in the months ahead will be prepared to aid Ho Chi Minh.

ELLEN HAMMER

(Miss Hammer, a former member of the Yale Institute of International Studies, is now completing a book on Indo-China. She also contributed the chapter on Indo-China in *The State of Asia*, published this year by Knopf.)

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Arms and the Atom

The importance of atomic weapons in the regulation of world affairs is easy to exaggerate. Despite statements by Winston Churchill in 1949 and by Gordon Dean, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, on October 5, 1951, that American possession of the atomic bomb had prevented World War III, the United States has not relied on the bomb to restrain the Soviet Union from expanding its sphere of influence. The form and execution of American foreign policy would be simple if President Truman had accepted the thesis of Churchill and Dean when American-Russian relations began to degenerate four years ago into their present state of dangerous rivalry. The existence of the Truman Doctrine, the North Atlantic alliance and the current program for expanding the arsenal of conventional armaments are evidence of the lack of faith in atomic weapons as an absolute factor in international relations.

American Atomic Policy

The secondary importance of the atomic bomb in the current phase of the diplomatic and political world struggle was true when the United States had a monopoly of atomic power and is all the truer now that the Soviet Union has proved beyond doubt its capacity to bring off an atomic explosion. The White House announced on October 3 that "another atom bomb has recently been exploded in the Soviet Union," and Premier Joseph Stalin confirmed the news on October 6. The disclosure annihilated all hope that the Soviet atomic explosion revealed by President Truman in 1949 was a freak event, not to be repeated. The new

explosion, however, is not likely to cause a change in American policy toward Russia.

The Soviet achievement emphasized more than ever the military character of the atomic weapons, as far as American official interest is concerned. The United States gives no sign of planning to propose a new scheme for international control of atomic weapons when the United Nations General Assembly meets in Paris next month. The primary aim of the United States is to replace existing weapons with atomic weapons. Instead of exploding arms with powder, the military hope in time is to do it with fission. According to Gordon Dean, the United States now can explode an atomic bomb over enemy troops, after the manner of an artillery shell, knocking them out of action by the blast without poisoning the ground with radioactivity. Eventually an artillery shell exploded by fission may become available. In testimony to the House Appropriations Committee on September 27 Dean said that the Atomic Energy Commission had "in development"—meaning not yet usable—"dozens of different types and kinds of special-purpose atomic weapons."

He forecast the use of atomic power to propel airplanes within ten years.

Interest in the development of an extensive atomic arsenal comes from two sources. One is concern for the effect of the military budget on the economy of the United States. Military appropriations for the current year amount to \$57.2 billion. On September 18, Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, said

that spending \$6 billion for atomic weapons (instead of the \$880 million spent in the 1951 fiscal year) would make possible the elimination of so many conventional weapons that the United States could save \$30 billion in its military spending. The second is the desire of the Department of Defense to augment the fighting strength of the United States military forces. On October 1 Defense Secretary Robert Lovett and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged on McMahon's committee a "major expansion" in the atomic weapons program. The tactical use of an atomic bomb in the Korean war is possible if forthcoming military exercises at Frenchmen's Flats, Nevada, enlighten the military services about the effect of atomic warfare on troops. Five thousand soldiers are to take part in the Frenchmen's Flats exercise.

Race for Uranium

This attitude toward atomic weapons portends longer casualty lists if war comes, but it does not lead us toward war any faster than the race in conventional arms. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has any incentive to assault the other with atomic weapons by surprise, for retaliation is possible. Victory in the race between the United States and the U.S.S.R. for supremacy in atomic weapons may depend in the long run on the relative availability of uranium to each country. If the Soviet Union has richer uranium deposits than the United States to draw on, the advantage which the United States gained from its four-year monopoly of atomic knowledge might soon disappear.

BLAIR BOLLES



Decline and Fall?

Less than a week after the British technicians of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company boarded the homeward bound cruiser *Mauritius* from Abadan, Premier Mustafa Nahas Pasha of Egypt on October 8 issued an invitation to the British garrison in the Suez Canal zone to do likewise. Three days later Iraq revealed that it had asked London to revise the treaty which allows the Royal Air Force to maintain bases on Iraqi soil.

To many observers, including some in electioneering Britain, these events appeared to be crippling blows at a tottering structure once known for its solidity, the British Empire. In reality, however, all three situations have been fermenting for years — products of nationalism sweeping across the Middle East — and none of them has quite reached the stage of finality.

Loopholes and Roadblocks

Even Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh's dramatic flight to New York to present his case before the Security Council on October 15 was carefully engineered to leave a loophole for further negotiations. The lack of revenue from Anglo-Iranian and other economic pressure which the British have brought to bear on Iran may yet produce modification of Teheran's attitude. Having lost their toehold in Abadan, the British, for their part, must do their bargaining on the basis of their tanker fleet and the market they provide for Iranian oil.

Egypt's desire to oust the British also is motivated by ardent nationalism. Premier Nahas, like Premier Mossadegh, is a shrewd septuagenarian, experienced in leading national-

ist causes. Otherwise the dispute over the 1936 treaty has its own tangled history. Nahas Pasha himself was the Egyptian negotiator who signed the agreement at a time when Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia worried Cairo. The two countries held talks in 1946 for revision of the treaty, but negotiations broke down over the Sudan. Egypt has long been irked over the fact that Britain exercises effective control over the joint condominium, a million-square-mile territory astride the upper Nile, Egypt's vital water supply. Cairo took the case to the Security Council in 1947 but failed to get an effective vote.

The Wafd party government, which took office after the January 1950 elections, immediately called for "British evacuation of both parts of the Nile valley," in other words, both the Suez Canal zone and the Sudan. Throughout 1951 government spokesmen have stated that they intended to abrogate the treaty by the end of the year. Premier Nahas' call to Parliament to approve decrees nullifying the agreement was adroitly timed to prevent the initiative from slipping his grasp. It came after London had notified Cairo that a "new" proposal for the solution of the impasse was being drafted and would be forwarded shortly.

The British proposal, published October 14, outlined a plan whereby Egypt would join, as an equal partner, the United States, Britain, France and Turkey in establishing an organization for Middle Eastern defense. London also suggested that Australia, New Zealand and South Africa be associated with the new command, in line with Commonwealth interest in strengthening the

area. For the Sudan an international commission was proposed; it would guide the Sudanese, already enjoying a measure of self-government, toward political maturity and an eventual choice as to whether they wanted to be joined to Egypt.

Role of the West

The Egyptian government rejected this compromise on October 15, and strong nationalist feeling led to anti-British disorders in the canal zone. Britain is taking a much firmer line with Egypt than with Iran, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson on October 10 indicated that the United States would press for the joint Middle East command as a substitute for the present arrangements. The Western powers will need patience as well as firmness in dealing with the Middle East. Iraq's request for revision of its treaty with Britain, Egypt's objection to UN plans for Libyan self-government and the continued lack of a negotiated peace settlement for Israel all represent difficult unfinished business.

Prevalent American comment on Britain's problems has been of the head-shaking variety, with the worried conclusion that the United States will have to step in once more, as it did in Greece in 1947, to take over commitments the British are no longer able to handle. In reality, however, Britain is not so weak as to be incapable of coercing nations such as Egypt and Iran. The British dilemma is the same as that faced by the United States in other parts of the world—how to win co-operation without coercion.

WILLIAM W. WADE



What Kind of Land Reform?

by Henry L. Roberts

Dr. Roberts, assistant professor of history at Columbia University, became interested in land reform problems as a result of his study of postwar agrarian changes in Eastern Europe. He is the author of *Rumania* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951).

The United States on September 3 introduced in the United Nations Economic and Social Council a resolution proposing sweeping measures to improve the lot of the farmer throughout the world. Isador Lubin, head of the American delegation, told the Council meeting at Geneva that land reform "can mean the difference between explosive tensions and stability, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and citizenship."

The resolution recommends that the governments provide an opportunity for the farmer to own his land, promote division of land into farms of efficient size, establish equitable tenures and enact legislation prohibiting exorbitant rentals—measures we may define as land reform in its narrower sense. Additional recommendations include fair tax shares for farmers, cooperatives for marketing and processing agricultural products, expanded agricultural credit facilities, improved rural education and more governmental research services.

Why Land Reform?

This resolution suggests two questions. First, why should land reform be a concern of American foreign policy? And, second, what is the nature of a problem which is thus declared to be world-wide?

The answer to the first question is fairly simple and largely political. True, the American humanitarian impulse finds a stimulating challenge in the "battle against poverty," and it seems evident that our own

prosperity stands to benefit from increased prosperity in the poorer, agrarian nations. Nevertheless, the principal reason land reform concerns foreign policy planning is obviously that the balance of world power may lie in the globe's most populous and least technically developed areas; and at present this balance is in danger of swinging against the United States. While the advances of Communist control in the past few years have been effected by force of arms through the wreckage of states disorganized by war, and not by social revolution, the array of techniques at the command of Leninism-Stalinism for utilizing social and economic discontent includes an elaborate tactical manual on "land reform." Hence, for reasons of national security alone, the United States cannot ignore the possibility that the world's agrarian poverty might be a weapon in the hands of the U.S.S.R.

The second question is more difficult. Is there really a common denominator for the agrarian problems of such geographically, culturally and economically diverse regions? Is there a solution, or a pattern of solutions, to remedy them?

Offhand it appears unlikely that agrarian problems throughout the economically backward parts of the world have any similarity beyond the obvious one of rural poverty. The peasant or native farmer may be poor, however, for a number of reasons: if his yield is low, if the amount of land is limited, if a large proportion of the agricultural output

goes to nonproducers—whether as rents, labor services, payments in kind, or interest—if the agricultural population is dense, or through a combination of these four factors. The problem of agrarian poverty is, to say the least, protean.

Impact of West

One factor, however, recurs in most regional monographs on agrarian problems, and while it is not the sole cause of the various manifestations of rural distress, it gives them a common setting: the dislocating impact of Western industrial civilization on the local society. Our machine-driven system of production and exchange penetrates and dissolves the social and economic patterns of less dynamic cultures. As a result, in spite of all their differences, the underdeveloped countries of the world are alike in being victims of this tremendous solvent.

Here are a few typical effects of the West's impact:

1. The "commercialization" of agriculture has meant the replacement of a predominantly subsistence economy by cash crops to permit the nation's purchase of industrial imports, which in turn undermine local handicrafts. In regions of traditional social inequality the peasant may in the process lose status, be driven from his land, or forced to accept a precarious tenancy. Even where these quasi-feudal results are absent, the stimulus of "cheap tin trays" serves to wrench the cultivator from his previous way of life. Statistical measurements may show an improved

level of income but at the cost of social stability.

2. The increased precision of the economic and legal relationships accompanying the Western impact, while adding an element of rationality, has frequently weakened the position of the average cultivator. For example, the American recognition of Spanish land grants in the Philippines had the effect of bestowing property rights on large sections of land to families originally given only tax collection rights by the Spaniards.

3. The economy of these areas inevitably becomes a dependent one, determined by external forces. This dependence may lead to a monoculture—coffee, sugar, rubber—which renders the whole of the economy vulnerable to shock and depression. It gives the native inhabitants, rightly or wrongly, the dangerous sense that their country is being drained for the benefit of outsiders.

4. Contact with the West is usually followed by a marked growth of the native population, sometimes, as on the island of Java, reaching astonishing proportions. While rural overpopulation looks like the greatest menace in many regions, its manifestations—inadequate holdings, unfavorable tenancies and hidden unemployment—can appear if a large part of the land is monopolized by great estates. Moreover, in view of the fact that a number of relatively uncrowded countries are also racked by rural poverty, one should not regard population pressure as the primary cause of such poverty but rather as a symptom of it and, at the same time, a serious obstacle to its elimination.

In varying degrees these consequences of the Western impact have shaped the agrarian problems of the nonindustrial regions of the world. The question today is whether this

impact affords any clues to appropriate measures for improvement.

Principles of Reform

The three obvious answers to rural poverty are 1) increasing the output and yield, 2) reducing the density of the agricultural population, or 3) increasing the percentage of the output going to the actual cultivator. Land reform largely concerns the third answer—an effort to increase the return to the peasant cultivator through reform of property relations by such means as redistributing land, revising laws on tenancies, or prohibiting excessive rents. It may, of course, include the consolidation of small parcels of land, but in most cases it is designed, and debated, as an equalizing measure.

The limitations to land reform are obvious. Reform as such does not alter the land-population ratio, and mere leveling cannot create a nation of satisfied cultivators with ample holdings. In areas of extremely unequal holdings, however, land reform can alleviate the economic situation of the poorest cultivators and hence may prove of utmost political importance. Above all, it can rectify a situation in which a dominant landowning class had reinforced its traditional position by combining its social prerogatives with the money derived from a commercialization of agriculture—a combination which has often meant ruthless exploitation of both the land and the peasant.

Against these advantages must be weighed the objection that creating a numerous class of small holders does not raise the level of agriculture and may well lower it. This danger is stated clearly in a summary by Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., of the postwar Japanese land reform, carried out under American sponsorship, in his study, *Japanese Land Reform Program*:

"Land transferred from landlords to tenants has completely reorganized the pattern of land ownership. . . . These accomplishments mark the end of the feudal land tenancy system of Japan. . . .

"Japanese farm units are badly fragmented and dispersed, wasting labor resources. Although land reform law and policy provided for an accompanying consolidation program, results were not satisfactory. . . . Declining farm size and further fractionalization of farm units still threaten Japanese agriculture."

Thus, land reform may not only destroy certain economies present in large farms (in many agrarian societies, however, large estates are not integrated undertakings but are leased out to the peasants) but may also intensify the disastrous fragmentation of farms.

After Land Reform—What?

The crucial question is what happens after the land reform. A successful small peasant agriculture is usually taken to mean a type of intensive and diversified cultivation, on the model of the highly productive farms of Denmark or Switzerland. This type of peasant farming depends, however, on the right kind of climate and an adequate market for its produce—conditions not present in many areas.

A serious dilemma thus emerges. The failure to achieve land reform means the perpetuation of oppressive conditions for the mass of the cultivators and a source of social disturbance. A redistribution of land may lead only to retrograde farming on inadequate holdings. The American's response to this dilemma is apt to be uncertain. He is opposed to anything that smacks of ingrained inequality and is sympathetic to the idea of the farmer being the master of the land he tills. At the same time

he is keenly aware of the economies of large-scale undertakings, which he associates, perhaps uncritically, with progressive methods of production.

This prevailing ambiguity in the American attitude toward land reform is particularly unfortunate because the U.S.S.R. has developed its own way of resolving the dilemma. First, the land is taken from the landlords and transferred to the peasants, and then it is removed from the peasants' private possession and consolidated in the form of collective farms. It is true, of course, that the first step is political in intent, to rouse the peasant against the old order, while the second is scarcely designed for his benefit but rather to bring him under state control and assure agricultural supplies to the government. Nevertheless, the Communists have a program whereby a real dilemma is overcome, in a fashion, by this disingenuous staging of agrarian dialectics. A successful American policy on land reform must be able to excel both aspects of the Russian technique. We shall fail if we concentrate on the redistribution of land without thought of its further development, or on productivity without thought of its social consequences.

It is doubtful, however, whether the solution is to be found in land reform alone or even in the sphere of purely rural changes. Some improvements in agricultural methods might be profitably introduced without a major reorganization of the village community or large capital outlay. Unfortunately, most benefits in this world are not acquired free; they must be paid for. Such improvements as appropriate mechanization, scientific irrigation, increased use of fertilizers, or even successful cooperatives and better agricultural credit facilities ultimately imply the

presence of capital, which is precisely what the peasant lacks. The reduction of the density of the rural population, historically at least, has been most effectively brought about by a movement of people from country to town in the wake of growing industrialization and by a corresponding modification of the birth rate.

Need for Industrialization

Any real amelioration of these agrarian problems seems to lie in the direction of greater industrialization, and a land reform program or any agricultural program which fails to work in such a context is likely to be, at best, of limited value. The power of the machine age must be called in to redress the economic balance it has overthrown.

It is impossible here to touch on the problems confronting the industrialization of underdeveloped areas, but two points might be made in conclusion. First, the best pattern for land reform can be developed only with reference to the country's economy as a whole. Whether the Cuban, the Iranian or the Japanese peasant would be best off as the cultivator of his own small farm, as a hired laborer on a large undertaking, or perhaps as a new town dweller cannot be determined solely by the immediate conditions in which he lives, but by reasoned judgments on the most suitable rural-urban balance and the most fruitful combination of regional contributions to the complex of world production. Whether he can indeed be freed from the mercies of an absentee landowner, bailiff or usurer, without becoming either the miserable occupant of a dwarf holding or an unwilling member of a collective farm depends on the accuracy of these judgments.

Second, prefabricated answers to these questions are not available.

We are becoming increasingly aware that the special circumstances which produced in Western Europe and America an expanding industrial society and a prosperous free agriculture are not automatically repeating themselves elsewhere in the world. When discussing Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America, one cannot safely rely on parallels drawn from Western European or American agriculture, which may prove dangerously misleading. On the other hand, two of the peripheral countries have tried their own solutions: Japan, before 1941, by superimposing industry on a feudal, labor-intensive agrarian economy; the Soviet Union, since 1917, by destroying the old landlord system and then linking a new pattern of agrarian discipline to the industrialization of the Five-Year plans. Both efforts, however, led to internal repression, the blighting of democracy, and ultimately a disruptive foreign policy. Elsewhere in the world the agrarian reforms after World War I were, by and large, disappointing; those following World War II have either been forced into the Soviet pattern or are as yet inconclusive in their results. A demonstrably satisfactory solution of the urgent problem of land reform has yet to be discovered.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., *Japanese Land Reform Program* (Tokyo, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Natural Resources Section, Report No. 127, 1950); Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949); Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva, League of Nations, 1945); Lowry Nelson, *Rural Cuba* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1950); *Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries: Land Reform* (Lake Success, UN Economic and Social Council, June 14, 1951), Doc. E/2003; Doreen Wariner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948).

As Others See Us

The French and Germans take widely divergent views of the policy of rearming West Germany, which the United States has been vigorously advocating since the fall of 1950. The French fear that Germany will use its armed forces, once they are re-created, to embark on new military adventures, and view the Plevin proposal for inclusion of German units in a European army—now accepted by Washington—as a useful device to keep the Germans in check. Thus the *Depêche du Midi* of Toulouse, a leading organ of the moderate Radical Socialist party, said on September 25: "Germany will only regain her sovereignty if she consents to place her future armed forces under the control of the military leaders of Western Europe, among whom it is not likely that Germans will figure."

A diametrically opposite interpretation is given by the moderate German journalist, Paul Bourdin, who, writing on the same day in the independent newspaper, *Weser-Kurier*, of Bremen, stated: "Germany must also be represented in Eisenhower's staff, for it is inconceivable that one should dispose of German divisions without Germany's participation in

the command or the planning." From the point of view of the Germans, even the most moderate, control by Germany over its armed forces is an essential feature of the national sovereignty Bonn is trying to recover.

Meanwhile, persisting French distrust of German intentions is reflected in *L'Information*, France's leading business and financial newspaper, where Edouard Daladier, former premier and Radical Socialist politician, declared on September 25: "If Germany regains freedom of

action, what guarantee do we have that she will not try to restore German unity, either by an agreement with Russia and the Communist government of East Germany or by a possible transformation of the now defensive Atlantic pact into an aggressive instrument? . . . The formation of a European army seems not to have the same meaning or the same goal for democratic France and for militant Germany. The National Assembly must examine thoroughly, therefore, the problems of its organization."



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON THE FAR EAST

Profile of Red China, by Lynn and Amos Landmann. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951. \$3.

Two American correspondents who lived in China from June 1948 through September 1950 give a detailed and vivid picture of the early stages of the Communist regime. While their book does not cover the Korean war, their description of prewar developments in China contributes to an understanding of the policies and objectives of the Peiping regime.

The Changing Map of Asia: A Political Geography, edited by W. Gordon East and O. H. K. Spate. New York, Dutton, 1950. \$5.50.

Writers on contemporary Asian developments too often ignore basic geographic factors which fundamentally restrict and influence political events and forces. In this volume two geographers at the University of London have rendered a distinct service

by bringing together in compact form essential data and analysis by different authorities, written in the light of problems faced by new Asian nations.

The Far East: A Social Geography, by A. D. C. Peterson. New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1951. \$4.75.

An extended essay giving the general reader an account of historical, social, economic, geographic and political aspects of the countries ranged in a broad, crescent from Pakistan to Japan.

China's Red Masters: Political Biographies of the Chinese Communist Leaders, by Robert S. Elegant. New York, Twayne, 1951. \$3.50.

The personalities of Chinese Communist leaders come alive in this collection of biographical sketches written by an author-journalist who draws on knowledge of both Chinese and Japanese sources as well as on interviews with confidential informants.

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Forum

Is It Wise to Rearm the Germans?

Yes—Major George Fielding Eliot

No—Dr. Saul K. Padover

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